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Abstract: Prolonged drought and climate change uncertainty has made a sustainable 
balance between uses of water much more urgent. Previous strategies have revolved around 
regulatory and market-based approaches to reduce the consumptive pool, leaving water in 
rivers for the environment. These approaches have so far simply maintained the status quo, 
i.e. the consumptive pool at more or less existing levels. Government intervention to 
purchase entitlements from irrigators for the environment through water markets is meant to 
break the status quo, but can that be achieved from a solitary focus upon entitlement 
recovery? 
This paper reviews the policies and events which have driven this process and identifies how 
the regulatory/market-based approaches have resulted in a status quo situation, to the 
detriment of achieving sustainable water use. We suggest that both historical approaches 
offer less reform value, and that appropriate market intervention is warranted. However, 
entitlement water purchasing alone may limit provision of wet water to key environmental 
sites during critical periods and perpetuate a continuation of the status quo arrangements. A 
suggested expansion of the water purchasing programme is therefore provided. 
Introduction 
The Australian government has recently announced a $12.9 billion Water for the Future Plan (Wong, 
2008) to recover, through a variety of means, up to 1,500Gls of water for the environment. Reduction 
of the consumptive pool by this amount provides a moderate chance of returning the river system to a 
sustainable working status (Jones et al., 2002). Efforts to reduce the consumptive pool via regulated 
planning, recognition of environmental water requirements by the states and the establishment of 
efficient water markets under the National Water Initiative (NWI) has been a continuing focus of the 
reform process. 
How well then does the new market-based water recovery purchasing plan fit into the existing context 
of consumptive pool reduction? Does it compliment, over-ride or de-emphasise the regulatory and 
market-based efforts to create sustainable use of water resources? And if either of the latter two 
options apply, where then does that leave these previous efforts which have had substantial resources 
and time applied to their outcomes? 
This paper explores these questions with an emphasis on identifying where the process might turn next 
if the interventionist water recovery approach fails to deliver anticipated results. 
The regulatory reform approach 
The Australian water reform process which began in the 1990s has been building toward a single 
outcome; the reduction of the consumptive pool to sustainable levels (COAG, 1994). In the Murray-
Loch, A. et al., Purchasing water to create sustainable systems: Where does that leave the regulatory approach? 
2 
Proceedings of the Environmental Research Event 2009, Noosa, QLD 
Darling Basin (MDB) reform has endured the added burden of multiple sovereign states and federal 
interests in the management, health and use of water. 
A variety of strategies have been applied to reduce over-allocation in the MDB. While the states have 
been charged with addressing over-allocation issues within their own sovereign boundaries, at the 
Basin-wide level there has also been significant negotiation and action in an effort to reduce the 
consumptive pool. 
Predominantly regulatory approaches have been adopted at the early strategies for water reform. These 
have included new water resource legislation, altered or newly created water-use regulations, capping 
water use within the MDB and the creation of water sharing plans (WSPs) to identify system yie lds, 
current consumptive use and minimum environmental flow requirements. In some cases, (e.g. 
Queensland) these WSPs have been able to provide adequate environmental water, but in other cases 
(e.g. NSW) some of these WSPs have been suspended due to drought, or environmental priorities have 
been overlooked in favour of consumptive needs (Wallace, 2009). 
However, with the introduction of the NWI a broadly consistent approach has been reached towards 
managing risks associated with failing to achieve consumptive pool reductions, i.e. risk sharing 
arrangements which affect the parties in different ways. These are detailed in Table 1 below , which 
divides the risk between the major parties dependent upon the cause of the reduction in reliability 
and/or the timing.  
Table 1-Water Sharing Plan Risks 
Reduced volumes or 
reliability via drought 
or climate change: 
Reduced volumes or 
reliability via improved 
knowledge (to 2014): 
Reduced volumes or 
reliability imposed 
after 2014: 
Reduced volumes or 
reliability via changed 
government policy: 
100% borne by the 
water license holders 
without compensation.  
100% borne by the 
water license holders. 
Users bear first 3% of 
reductions. States (1/3) 
Commonwealth (2/3) 
share between 3% and 
6% reduction. Above 
6% reduction, States 
and Commonwealth 
share equally. 
Governments bear fully 
any reduction or loss of 
reliability.  
(COAG, 2004, para's 46-51) 
In some instances (e.g. column two and three) there is the potential for irrigator pro rata reductions to 
take place, i.e. an across the board reduction of the consumptive pool. Elsewhere (e.g. column four) 
governments must bear fully any decreased reliability. Importantly though, it must be remembered that 
the consequence of not managing these risks is the continued degradation of MDB environmental 
health. Although some reform observers have called for mandatory pro-rata reductions to current 
entitlements in order to achieve a solution to over-allocation and resource degradation (Young & 
McColl, 2007) this option, like similar strategies in the USA (e.g. Slaughter & Wiener, 2007) remains 
politically unpopular. Furthermore, it can be argued that such strategies simply remove water from 
efficient and inefficient users alike (Thoyer 2006). Consequently, pressure on governments to act in 
ways that avoid pro rata reduction approaches has grown alongside recognition of the importance of 
sustainable ecosystem health and water quality (Ladson & Finlayson, 2004). 
A useful definition of sustainable resource use has either been elusive or heavily debated during water 
reform, often providing an excuse to defer environmental actions. The states have pressed forward 
though, reacting to the need for sustainable resource use by implementing regulatory measures and 
water planning arrangements (Environment Australia, 1994). In turn this has led to a myriad of 
independent systems, often at odds with one another (National Water Commission, 2007). Basin issues 
that cross state boundaries, however, require collective arrangements. One example of basin-wide 
negotiation and action to address sustainable use through regulation was the introduction in 1997 of a 
permanent Cap on MDB water use (MDBMC, 1996). The effect of the Cap was to limit extractions to 
the level of development present in 1993-94. This regulatory strategy closed the door to the issuing of 
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new water entitlements to irrigation entrants; anyone wishing to begin a new operation would need to 
purchase a license from existing entitlement holders. While not reducing the level of consumptive use 
the Cap was aimed at curtailing further resource degradation. Unfortunately the Cap has accelerated 
groundwater extraction and the trade in sleeper and dozer licenses, sometimes to the detriment of 
existing irrigators’ rights (Scanlon, 2002). 
Another regulatory approach outcome has been the establishment of secure and transferable property 
rights in water (Moran, 2003). However, while property rights might assist in the reallocation of 
resources among competing uses, they are not expected to remove disputes over the outcomes of the 
rationing process (Watson, 2006). In fact, as Thoyer (2006, pg. 6) observes, ‘the necessary 
reinforcement of water rights, in order to implement efficient water markets, runs contradictory with 
the necessary attenuation of rights in order to allow states to reduce entitlements in the name of 
environmental protection’. So the property rights outcome, while positive for consumptive users, 
might not assist in reducing the consumptive pool of entitlements. This said secure property rights can 
still be subject to adaptive management approaches since they are defined as a share of the available 
resource, which can alter from season to season—i.e. the share is secure, but what it is a share of is 
less defined. Markets then play an important role in the valuation and movements of these shares 
between users. 
An important result of the regulatory approach has been the foundations for water markets in Australia 
with an emphasis on the transfer of water assets to their highest value uses. An issue with this is that 
the environment has not represented an obvious high value use for water and, as such, water markets 
have not automatically addressed the imbalance in the system between consumptive and 
environmental uses. Like most market transactions, trades in water are based on private benefits and 
costs (Tisdell & Ward, 2003) not readily accommodating social needs above the individual level. 
Therefore, water markets left to their own devices will allocate too much to consumptive uses and not 
enough to environmental flows, providing a prima facie case for government intervention (Freebairn, 
2005). 
It is perhaps not surprising then that the first biennial assessment of the NWI found water markets had 
failed to address over-allocation and improve environmental outcomes (Working Group on Climate 
Change and Water, 2008). Among a set of urgent actions proposed was the coordination of efforts in 
purchasing water for the environment (National Water Commission, 2008). Such programs are 
referred to as water recovery or buy back strategies. In Australia it was only a matter of time before a 
water purchasing strategy was proposed for irrigated agriculture to ameliorate flow-related 
environmental damage (Watson, 2006). It would seem then that regulatory and voluntary market-
based approaches have not delivered the required consumptive reductions sought. To combat this 
failure the federal government has now implemented an interventionist water recovery strategy that 
may or may not offer the basis for successfully achieving a sustainable water balance. 
The shift from regulatory to market approaches 
The shift across regulatory and voluntary market-based approaches toward government interventionist 
water purchasing has occurred over many years. Put simply, regulatory approaches and voluntary 
market transfers have failed to deliver required environmental water outcomes. The state level 
contradiction between enforceable property rights and required reductions to provide for the 
environment, discussed above, has most often emphasised the continuation of the status quo, in this 
case the protection of consumptive uses at the expense of the environment. Within the regulatory 
approach we refer to this as the cycle of deferment (see Figure 1 below). This cycle would likely have 
continued had not prolonged drought and the uncertainty of climate change re-emphasised the urgent 
need to reduce the consumptive pool and, as discussed above, caused a variety of WSPs to be 
suspended or ignored in favour of irrigation commitments. 
While the regulatory approach set a foundation for water markets, their establishment required further 
time and resources. Also importantly for later water recovery programs the Cap, as discussed above, 
set a limit to further diversions which subsequently emphasised the role of markets in adjustment to 
meet development aspirations or seasonal operating requirements. But the damage inflicted from 
previous expansionist policy and an increasing recognition by users of the inherent value in their water 
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assets resulted in irrigators not associating any low value toward water; unfortunate considering that 
this was whom reformers were counting upon to provide water for redistribution (Productivity 
Commission, 2003). Instead, most irrigators remain determined to hold onto their entitlements and use 
the allocation market to sustain themselves in the industry, even when operating inefficient properties 
(Bjornlund, 2006). 
Consequently, the anticipated redistribution via markets has not taken place; something formally 
recognised and addressed by an intergovernmental agreement (IGA-OA) on over-allocation in 2004. 
While a free market will normally provide the most efficient means of allocating water between uses, 
this premise does not hold where a market for one use is absent—such as was the case for 
environmental water (ABARE, 2008, pg. 272). Efforts to find willing sellers of entitlements have 
since been promoted (e.g. the MDB Living Murray Initiat ive and the NSW RiverBank recovery 
programs), which in the main focus upon entitlement purchases in keeping with the IGA-OA. This 
framework for water recovery unfortunately has also largely failed to acquire anywhere near the 500Gl 
target set in 2005 (National Water Commission, 2009). 
By 2006 a number of key events worked to force the hand of governments in their effort to address 
over-allocation. These included formal recognition of the volume required to achieve a moderate 
chance of returning the system to a sustainable working river status—1,950Gls (Jones et al., 2002) 
later downgraded by the MDBMC to 1,500Gls (Jones et al., 2003), and CSIRO reports that risks such 
as climate change, farm dams and afforestation could decrease future stream flows between 2,500 and 
5,500Gls within 20 years (van Dijk et al., 2006). 
Figure 1—The cycle of deferment 
The urgency of these events and continuing drought in the MDB resulted in a hasty decision (Watson, 
2007, pg. 1) to intervene in the water market on behalf of the environment. As Holland et al (1999, pg. 
67) observed in the fisheries industry, such intervention usually has more to do with politics that the 
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technical feasibility of addressing actual environmental requirements. Political solutions emerge far 
quicker than real environmental solutions to these issues it would seem. 
In fact debate over environmental solutions for the MDB, while on-going, has at least settled on the 
adoption of adaptive arrangements aimed at ensuring that maximum benefit is derived from provided 
flows (DEWHA, 2008). These adaptive strategies aim to recover water for six icon environmental 
sites along the Murray River, focusing on the purchase of entitlements from willing sellers. But to 
acquire 1,500Gls will require the purchase of 100% of average entitlement trades for the next 14 years 
(WaterFind Pty Ltd, 2008)—an arguably unrealistic objective. 
Such purchases would have enormous impact upon the ability of the entitlement market to play a role 
in drought adjustment, but equally the size of this recovery target would suggest that the 
interventionist market approach now over-rides the regulatory and voluntary market-based approaches 
in managing the consumptive pool reduction. There is an advantage to this approach in that any water 
recovered through the markets may allow for a future mitigation of the risks as stated in the WSPs, 
reducing the scope for risk sharing to take place on either side. 
This outcome hinges upon the level of willing entitlement sellers that can be attracted to the recovery 
process, but unfortunately analyses to this point (e.g. Bjornlund, 2006) would suggest that willing 
entitlement sellers may be hard to find. Therefore an expansion of the program to include additional 
allocation trade products such as derivatives, options and contracts may be warranted to improve 
irrigator willingness to engage in the environmental water recovery program. 
The need for an alternative approach 
If regulatory and voluntary market-based approaches have diminished in value and the interventionist 
market-based approach aimed at entitlement purchasing is flawed in terms of attracting willing sellers 
and in terms of securing wet water for the environmental sites of interest, where might governments 
turn next if the required consumptive pool reduction outcomes still remain unachieved? Does 
expansion to alternative allocation trade products offer any advantage? 
An examination of license recovery programs in the fisheries industry may offer important support to 
an allocation trade product expansion strategy. In that industry recovery program, government buyers 
found that many sellers held out for higher prices which were required to attract willing sellers (Sun, 
2004), and that it becomes harder to achieve effective reduced consumption if those users who impact 
it most remained in the system (Squires 2006). This finding seems to be particularly pertinent to 
recovery programs with a singular purchasing option focus (English, Brearley, & Coggan, 2004; 
Scoccimarro & Collins, 2006). 
Where the management of key environmental sites involves adaptive strategies around flow 
requirements, it would seem practical to turn toward an application of similar adaptive strategies to the 
water recovery process. Part of the problem now facing environmental managers is that the shift to 
water purchasing has occurred within too limited a framework, and without the appropriate inclusion 
of alternative trade products other than entitlement purchases to provide environmental water. 
The environment requires water to be re-distributed from irrigators towards flow regimes. To achieve 
this the range of trade products currently utilisable on behalf of the environment should be widened, 
allowing recovered water volumes to increase, and thereby possibly minimising the current 
degradation externalities that future generations are required to contend with. Such expanded trade 
products might include the inclusion of derivative, options and contract style products which have an 
emphasis on allocation transfers rather than entitlements. A research program to be conducted in 2009-
10 will be investigating irrigator perceptions and attitudes toward such products and providing 
empirical evidence to support the claims made here. 
Conclusions 
An adaptive water recovery program will therefore work best if it comprises a range of trade products 
that target the highest proportion of consumptive users, across the broadest possible geographic scale 
to allow effective matching with environmental sites of interest and provide redistribution of water to 
those systems, even if only for a season. 
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Significant regulatory and voluntary market-based effort has been expended in reducing the 
consumptive pool. These efforts have had limited success and for the most part simply resulted in 
maintaining the status quo. Market intervention on behalf of the environment may improve these 
outcomes for Murray River sites but if not, future options appear limited. Adaptive purchasing 
strategies that include expanded trade options such as derivatives, options and contracts based around 
the allocation market may provide a useful policy direction to explore further, with likely successful 
outcomes for the environmental objectives and flow requirements at critical times. 
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